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NOTES
BETTER NEVER THAN LATE: PRE-ARREST
DELAY AS A VIOLATION OF DUE
PROCESS
Pre-arrest delay occurs when there is a time lapse between comple-
tion of a prosecution's investigation of a case and notification of the
defendant of the charges to be brought against him.' In Ross v. United
States,2 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,. relying
upon its supervisory power over criminal proceedings,3 became the first
court to reverse a criminal conviction on the basis of prejudicial pre-
arrest delay. The court in dictum also stated that pre-arrest delay
might violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Other courts, both state and federal, have responded to Ross by
treating pre-arrest delay claims as constitutional violations,5 and dicta
in two subsequent United States Supreme Court opinions acknowledge
the possibility of a fifth amendment violation resulting from pre-indict-
ment delay. The constitutional standard suggested by the Supreme
Court is very strict,7 and the lower courts have applied it in conflicting
ways.8  The concept of deciding pre-arrest delay cases under the
court's supervisory powers has been in essence disregarded, with the
result that many defendants who might have received reversals under
an equity-supervisory evaluation lost their appeals because they were
unable to meet the applicable constitutional standards.9
This Note will review the factors considered by the courts in evalu-
ating pre-arrest delay claims and will analyze how these factors have
been organized into different standards for passing upon such claims.
The Note will further suggest a two-pronged analysis of pre-arrest de-
lay claims: first, as a claim under the constitutional right to due process
1. See Note, Pre-Arrest Delay: Evolving Due-Process Standards, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 722, 728
(1968).
2. 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
3. For a discussion of supervisory powers, see notes 19-20 infra and accompanying text.
4. 349 F.2d at 211. See text accompanying note 16 infra.
5. See cases cited at notes 17-18 infra.
6. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796-97 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307, 324-25 (1471).
7. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 28-33 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 18-21 infra.
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of law in criminal proceedings and, second, as an appeal to a court to
apply its equitable supervisory powers to prevent gross and substantial
injustice.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the landmark case of Ross v. United States,l" the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed a criminal convibtion be-
cause of a lengthy and unjustified pre-arrest delay. The defendant, a
man of limited education and irregular employment, was arrested
* seven months after allegedly selling narcotics to an undercover police-
man. He testified that he was unable to reconstruct the events of the
day of the offense, and even the policeman was unable to testify with-
out refreshing his memory by reference to a notebook. The court
found that there had been a "purposeful delay" by the police1' and that
the delay was not "necessitated by the requirements of effective law-
enforcement" since the undercover narcotics investigation conducted
during the three months prior to the arrest involved primarily duplica-
tion of previous investigations.1 2
The court also found that the defendant had asserted a "plausible
claim of inability to recall or reconstruct the events of the day of the
offense,"'" and pointed out that the prosecution was based solely upon
the refreshed recollection of one witness. 4 In light of these factors, the
circuit court reversed the conviction, relying upon its "supervisory re-
sponsibility for criminal proceedings."' 5 In addition to its holding, the
court recognized the principle that "due process may be denied when a
formal charge is delayed for an unreasonably oppressive and unjustifi-
able time after the offense to the prejudice of the accused."' 6
The immediate judicial response to Ross was ambiguous at best. 17
10. 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
11. Id at 215.
12. Id at 213.
13. Id at 215.
14. Id at 211, 215.
15. Id at 216.
16. Id at 211 (quoting Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 810 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
17. The Sixth Circuit rejected the Ross principle, Lothridge v. United States, 441 F.2d 919
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1003 (1971), while the Fifth Circuit refused to take any position,
McConnell v. United States, 402 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969). The appli-
cation of the Ross principle made some progress in the federal district courts, however, as six
indictments were dismissed and/or convictions overturned between 1968 and 1971. United States
v. Kleinbard, 333 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Jones, 322 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); United States v. King, 332 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1971); United States v. Wahrer, 319
F. Supp. 585 (D. Alas. 1970); United States v. Haulman, 288 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Mich. 1968);
United States v. Curry, 284 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. 111. 1968). Id the state courts, the Ross principle
was cautiously applied, as only two state courts reversed on Ross grounds prior to 1971. People
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Furthermore, those courts that accepted the Ross principle defined it in
terms of a due process violation rather than as a matter of their supervi-
sory jurisdiction."8 Although the federal courts and most of the state
courts have the power to reverse convictions on the sole basis of gross
or substantial injustice, independent of any specific legal point of ap-
peal,19 and although this power has often been exercised,20 the courts
chose to develop a new constitutional doctrine. In employing this doc-
trine, however, courts frequently distinguished cases on their facts, and
v. Hryciuk, 36 Ill. 2d 500, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967); People v. Hernandez, 15 Mich. App. 141, 170
N.W.2d 851 (1969).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Feldman, 425 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Baker,
424 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1970); Acree v. United States, 418 F.2d 427 (10th Cir. 1969); Jordan v.
United States, 416 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); United States v. Lee,
413 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1022 (1970); United States v. Feinberg, 383
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1967); Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735 (Ist Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 920 (1968); Terlikowski v. United States, 379 F.2d 501 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1008
(1967); McKay v. State, 489 P.2d 145 (Alas. 1971); State v. Hodge, 153 Conn. 564, 219 A.2d 367
(1966); People v. Hryciuk, 36 IM. 2d 500, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967); Jones v. State, 3 Md. App. 616,
240 A.2d 790 (1968); Commonwealth v. Jones, 360 Mass. 498, 275 N.E.2d 143 (1971); People v.
Hernandez, 15 Mich. App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1969); State v. Deckard, 459 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.
1970); Scott v. State, 84 Nev. 530, 444 P.2d 902 (1968); State v. Roundtree, 106 NJ. Super. 135,
254 A.2d 337 (1969), rev'don other grounds, 118 N.J. Super. 22,285 A.2d 564 (1971); State v. Baca,
82 N.M. 144, 477 P.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1970); People v. Collins, 66 Misc. 2d 340, 320 N.Y.S.2d 693
(1971); State v. McClintick, 23 Ohio Misc. 194, 255 N.E.2d 885 (1970); Commonwealth v.
McCloud, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 230, 275 A.2d 841 (1971); Gonzales v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 548, 177
N.W.2d 843 (1970). But see United States v. Sanchez, 361 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1966), in which the
court noted that Ross was decided pursuant to the D.C. Circuit's supervisory responsibilities over
its criminal proceedings.
19. The Supreme Court has discussed the federal courts' supervisory powers as follows:
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies
the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.
Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal historic safe-
guards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as "due process of law" and
below which we reach what is really trial by force.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
State courts have long claimed similar powers to direct the course of criminal trials and to set
standards of fairness higher than those required by constitutional mandates. E.g., Hohl v. Board
of Educ., 250 Iowa 502, 94 N.W.2d 787 (1959); Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. 1961); In re
Mild's Estate, 25 NJ. 467, 136 A.2d 875 (1957); State ex rel Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702,
410 P.2d 732 (1966); State ex rel Olson v. Lynch, 138 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1965); Staub v. Tehol
Corp., 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 606,211 A.2d 88 (1965); State ex rel Reynolds v. County Ct., I1 Wis. 2d
560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960). But see Winfrey v. Chandler, 159 Tex. 220, 318 S.W.2d 59 (1958).
20. See, eg., Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1945) (Court exercised supervisory
powers to reverse conviction where daily wage earners were excluded from jury panel); McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (Court exercised supervisory powers to suppress confession
obtained in an uncivilized manner); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (court
exercised supervisory powers to refuse jurisdiction over Frisbee v. Collins-type defendants (Fris-
bee v. Collins, 342 U.S. 179 (1952)); Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1973) (court
exercised supervisory powers to assure strict compliance with rule 11); United States v. Fioravanti,
412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969) (court exercised supervisory powers to
declare that the use of Allen charges will normally result in reversal).
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convictions were rarely overturned. 2
The United States Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in
United States v. Marion," a case involving a three-year pre-indictment
delay. The indictment against the defendant had been dismissed by
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.23 The
Supreme Court reversed this dismissal, finding that the defendant's
claim of prejudice was purely speculative and holding the statute of
limitations to be the primary guarantee against overly stale criminal
charges.24 The Court qualified its decision, however, and for the first
time recognized that undue pre-arrest or pre-indictment delay may vio-
late due process:
Nevertheless, . . since appellees may claim actual prejudice to their
defense, it is appropriate to note here that the statute of limitations
does not fully define the appellees' rights with respect to the events
occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the Government concedes that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would require dis-
missal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indict-
ment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees'
rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to
gain tactical advantage over the accused . . 2
The Court further observed that almost any delay, no matter how
reasonable, may harm the defendant's case26 and that a showing of
prejudice without more would not necessarily violate due process. 27
Thus, the Marion dictum clearly acknowledged that a due process
claim might result from pre-arrest delay and seemingly identified two
factors-substantial prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial and
use of the delay as an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over
the accused-that must exist concurrently in order to establish a consti-
tutional violation. Nevertheless, the lower courts have maintained that
Marion failed to state conclusively whether the two factors cited were
21. See cases cited at note 18 supra.
22. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
23. Id at 310.
24. Id at 322, 326. The Court dismissed the defendant's claim based on the sixth amend-
ment, holding that the right to a speedy trial attaches only after formal charges have been brought.
Id at 320.
25. Id at 324 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the Court's opinion seemed to authorize the
lower court to reconsider its dismissal after trial: "Events of the trial may demonstrate actual
prejudice, but at the present time appellees' due process claims are speculative and premature."
Id at 326. However, the Court has since stated that this passage "establishes only that proof of
actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication, not that it makes
the claim automatically valid." United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977).
26. 404 U.S. at 324.
27. Id at 324-25; accord, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) ("proof of
prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim"). See text
accompanying note 41 infra.
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to be applied in a conjunctive or disjunctive fashion.2" The result has
been a split among the circuits and the states, with some courts apply-
ing the factors disjunctively,29 some conjunctively,30 some adopting a
balancing test,3" some refusing to take a definitive position32 and others
rejecting the Ross-Marion principle altogether.33
The proper constitutional treatment of the pre-arrest delay prob-
lem was most recently faced by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lovasco,34 which involved an eighteen-month delay in indicting a de-
fendant for possession of firearms stolen from the mail and for dealing
in firearms without a license .3  The defendant claimed that as a result
of the delay he had lost the testimony of two important witnesses, who
had since died. No evidence concerning the reasons for the delay was
offered by the government in the district court proceeding. In fact, the
28. E.g., United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. lannelli,
461 F.2d 483, 485 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972). For a discussion of the applica-
tion of Marion in the federal courts, see United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847, 849-55 (D.
Md. 1976).
29. State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976). See generaly United States v. Gio-
calone, 477 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stamas, 443 F.2d 860 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971).
30. United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976);
United States v. MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1974); Crawford v. State, 6 Ala. App. 71, 342
So. 2d 450 (1977); State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 509 P.2d 331 (1973); State v. Royal, 217 Kan.
197, 535 P.2d 413 (1975); Blake v. State, 15 Md. App. 674, 292 A.2d 780 (1972); State v. Thomas,
529 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1975).
31. This test essentially involves weighing the reasonableness of the delay against the
prejudice suffered by the defendant, but does not require that the defendant prove a deliberate
attempt by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Jackson, 504 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964
(1975); United States v. Benson, 487 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Iannelli, 461 F.2d
483 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66 (Alas. 1972); People v.
Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d 526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973); Coca v. District Ct., 187 Colo. 280,
530 P.2d 958 (1975); In re G.T., 304 A.2d 865 (D.C. 1973); State v. Bryson, 53 Hawaii 652, 500
P.2d 1171 (1972); People v. Lawson, 67 Ill.2d 449, 367 N.E.2d 1244 (1977); People v. Fiorini, 53
Mich. App. 389, 220 N.W.2d 70 (1974), rev'd after rehearing on facts, 59 Mich. App. 243, 229
N.W.2d 399 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 407, 352 A.2d 107 (1975).
32. McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Judice, 457
F.2d 414 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 (1972). In more recent opinions, panels of the Fifth
Circuit have opted for conflicting standards. Compare United States v. Shaw, 555 F.2d 1295 (5th
Cir. 1977) (balancing test) with United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1977) (disjunctive
application) and United States v. Byrum, 540 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1976) (conjunctive application).
Several states remain similarly uncommitted, see, e.g., Alexander v. State, 129 Ga. App. 395, 199
S.E.2d 918 (1973); State v. Clapp, 335 A.2d 879 (Me. 1975); State v. Bellcourt, 293 Minn. 446, 196
N.W.2d 610 (1972), although it is clear from the opinions that in these jurisdictions the defendant
has to establish that he has been prejudiced by the delay.
33. State v. Robles, 110 Ariz. 184, 516 P.2d 320 (1973); State v. Freeman, 276 So. 2d 546 (Fla.
Dist. CL App.), cert. denied, 283 So. 2d 366 (1973); Baldwin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1973).
34. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
35. Id at 784.
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parties stipulated that little additional information related to the crimes
was discovered subsequent to the preparation of a Postal Inspector's
report one month after the commission of the crimes.3 6
The district court, finding that the delay of seventeen months after
completion of the investigative report was "unnecessary and unreason-
able" and that the defendant had been prejudiced as a result of the
delay, dismissed the indictment.37 On appeal, the government for the
first time offered an explanation for the delay, contending that further
investigation had been necessary to establish that the defendant's son
was responsible for the theft.38 Accepting-the government's explanation
on its face, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless found the delay to have
been "unjustified, unnecessary, and unreasonable. ' 39  The court also
held that the defendant had demonstrated sufficient prejudice by as-
serting that one of the missing witnesses could have corroborated his
contention that he was unaware that the guns were stolen.40
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Lovasco by noting that
"Marion makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary
but not sufficient element of a due process claim ' 41 and that "the due
process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the
prejudice to the accused. ' 42  The Court then rejected the Eighth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the government's hope of discovering other par-
ticipants in the crimes was not adequate justification for the delay,
cautioning that the "Due Process Clause does not permit courts to
abort criminal prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prose-
cutor's judgment as to when to seek an indictment. 43  Rather, a
court's function is limited to determining whether pre-arrest delay in a
given case offends "those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie
at the base of our civil and political institutions." 44
Having framed the nature of its inquiry in this manner, the Court
then observed that prosecutors are not constitutionally required to seek
indictments as soon as probable cause exists to believe that a suspect
has committed a crime, nor as soon as there is enough evidence to
36. Id
37. As reported in United States v. Lovasco, 532 F.2d 59, 60 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S.
783 (1977). The district court opinion is unpublished.
38. 431 U.S. at 786.
39. 532 F.2d at 61.
40. Id The court, however, reversed the district court's dismissal of the count charging the
defendant with dealing in firearms without a license, since it was not alleged that the missing
witnesses could have helped to exculpate the defendant with respect to that charge.
41. 431 U.S. at 790. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
42. 431 U.S. at 790.
43. Id
44. Id (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
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prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court noted that such a
requirement would produce undesirable consequences for effective law
enforcement45 and for the rights of the accused.' Thus, a distinction
was drawn between delay for investigative purposes and delay rooted
solely in a desire to gain some advantage over the accused, "precisely
because investigative delay is notso one-sided." 47
Significantly, the Court in Lovasco did not even consider the na-
ture or quantum of prejudice resulting to the defendant, holding in-
stead that "to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does
not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been
somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time."' 48  Furthermore, although
the trial record contained no evidence concerning the reasons for the
delay, the Court accepted the government's appellate representations
that the delay was caused by further investigative efforts, assuming
them to "have been made in good faith. ' 49  The Court thus reversed
the lower court's action and reinstated the indictment.50
As in Marion, however, the Court did leave open the possibility
that pre-arrest delay could constitute a fifth amendment violation in
other factual contexts:
45. According to the Court, "a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause"
could cause potential sources of information or evidence to disappear before proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt was amassed. 431 U.S. at 791-92. Such a requirement would also result in
judicial resources being wasted on insubstantial matters and proceedings involving only some of
the relevant parties or transactions.
Similarly, if prosecutors were compelled to file charges "as soon as the requisite proof has
been developed against one participant on one charge," id. at 792-93, investigative efforts as to
other suspects or other crimes might be hampered. Id. And, although additional charges might
be brought subsequently in some cases, the result would be "multiple trials involving a single set
of facts." Id at 793. Prosecutors, in the face of such a rule, might also tend to resolve doubtful
cases in favor of "early-and possibly unwarranted-prosecutions" in order to avoid the risk that
a later indictment would be quashed on account of pre-arrest delay. Id Finally, if prosecution
were required to be initiated immediately upon obtaining evidence sufficient to establish guilt, the
government would not be able to fully consider the desirability of proceeding in a particular case.
Id at 794.
46. The Court noted that any requirement that charges be brought upon the establishment of
probable cause could "increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed" and "add to the
time during which defendants stand accused but untried." Id. at 791. And, as discussed in note
45 supra, the Court reasoned that such a rule might subject a defendant to multiple trials arising
out of the same transactions.
As to a rule requiring indictments upon the obtaining of evidence sufficient to establish guilt,
the Court pointed out that such a rule might lead to premature, unwarranted prosecutions and
could possibly result in cases being tried that, upon fuller consideration, might not have been
prosecuted. 431 U.S. at 790-92.
47. 431 U.S. at 795.
48. Id at 796.
49. Id
50. Id at 797.
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In Marion we conceded that we could not determine in the ab-
stract the circumstances in which preaccusation delay would require
dismissing prosecutions. More than five years later, that statement
remains true. Indeed, in the intervening years so few defendants
have established that they were prejudiced by delay that neither this
Court nor any lower court has had a sustained opportunity to con-
sider the constitutional significance of various reasons for delay."1
We therefore leave to the lower courts, in the first instance, the task
of applying the settled principles of due process that we have dis-
cussed to the particular circumstances of individual cases.5 2
Inasmuch as the Lovasco decision failed to establish definitive
standards according to which due process claims based upon pre-arrest
delays should be evaluated, it can be assumed that the lower courts will
continue to apply their own standards in the same conflicting manner
in which they have been applied over the last twelve years. The next
section of this Note will review the factors considered by the various
lower federal and state courts in evaluating pre-arrest delay claims, and
the following section will analyze how these factors have been orga-
nized into different standards for passing upon such claims.
II. FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURTS
A. Prejudice.
An essential element in a criminal defendant's assertion of a viola-
tion of due process caused by pre-arrest delay is a showing of prejudice
to the preparation of his defense. When the delay is of short duration
a few courts will presume a lack of prejudice.5 3 For administrative
convenience, the District of Columbia Circuit has developed a rough
rule of thumb-a lack of prejudice will be presumed from a delay of
51. This conclusion of the Court is questionable at best. In a number of lower court cases
decided after Marion, the defendant was able to establish sufficient prejudice to warrant a consid-
eration of the reason for the delay. E.g., United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973) (justification of diligent efforts to locate defendant outweighed
prejudice); Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (justification of undercover
narcotics investigation outweighed prejudice); United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847 (D.
Md. 1976) (evidence of intentional delay causing substantial prejudice to defendant required find-
ing that prosecutorial delay had resulted in violation of defendant's due process rights); United
States v. Kleinbard, 333 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (prejudice to defendant outweighed reasons
set forth by government as justification for delay). See also Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66 (Alas.
1972) (delay of eight months prejudicial where state did not attempt to justify the delay); People v.
Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d 526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973) (remanded to determine if justifica-
tion of continuing undercover narcotics investigation outweighed prejudice).
52. 431 U.S. at 796-97 (citations omitted).
53. United States v. Kellerman, 432 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1970) (two-week delay); Daniels v.
United States, 357 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (eight-week delay).
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less than four months.' On the other hand, some courts will presume
the existence of prejudice when the delay is unusually lengthy.55 In
general, however, courts prefer not to presume the existence or lack of
prejudice solely from the length of the delay.16
The major premise underlying an assertion of prejudice is that "an
innocent man has no reason to fix in his memory the happenings on the
day of the alleged crime,"5 7 nor to search for witnesses or retain docu-
mentary evidence. Therefore, if a defendant has received any type of
notice that he is under criminal suspicion before formal arrest, his
claim of prejudice due to pre-arrest delay must fail.5 8 Assuming, how-
ever, that a defendant has not received any pre-arrest notice of suspi-
cion, the question arises as to what constitutes prejudice.
In Ross, a "plausible claim of inability to recall or reconstruct the
54. United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Robinson v. United States, 459
F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55. United States v. Jasper, 331 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated and remanded for
reconsideration, 460 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1972) (two-and-one-third-year delay); People v. Hryciuk,
36 Ill. 2d 500, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967) (fourteen-year delay); see King v. United States, 369 F.2d
213, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 910 (1967) (Edgerton, J., dissenting) (thirteen-
month delay). But see United States v. Tate, 336 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (fifteen-month
delay).
56. United States v. Stamas, 443 F.2d 860 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971) (six-
month delay will not be presumed unreasonable); United States v. Wilford, 364 F. Supp. 738 (D.
Del. 1973), aI'd, 493 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1974) (nine-week delay will not be presumed reasonable).
57. Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905
(1964) (Wright, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., United States v. McClure, 473 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (defendant charged
with embezzlement received notice that he was under criminal suspicion when he was fired from
his job at credit union and sought the advice of counsel at that time); United States v. Feldman,
425 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1970) (defendant charged with concealing assets of a bankrupt from a re-
ceiver was put on notice that he was under criminal suspicion when he was interviewed by federal
agents during the investigation); United States v. Milstein, 401 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1968) (defendant
charged with possessing liquor bottles containing distilled spirits other than those originally bot-
tled received notice that he was under criminal suspicion when his bottles were confiscated by law
enforcement agents); Terlikowski v. United States, 379 F.2d 501 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1008 (1967) (defendant facing federal charges for breaking into a U.S. post office received notice
that he was under criminal suspicion when state charges growing out of the same incident were
promptly filed against him and a preliminary hearing was held in municipal court); United States
v. Kramer, 286 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1972) (defendant charged with negligent homicide received notice
that he was under criminal suspicion when he was told, within one month of the offense, that
charges would be brought against him); People v. Johnson, 41 Mich. App. 34, 199 N.W.2d 561
(1972) (defendant charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm was presumed to have
had notice that he was under criminal suspicion when he continually eluded police officers trying
to apprehend him). It could even be argued that the defendant in Lovasco had notice that he was
under criminal suspicion, as he "made numerous anxious inquiries of the postal inspectors con-
cerning whether he would be indicted. ... United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 800 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). If this is the case, then Lovasco's assertion of prejudice could have been
immediately dismissed, and the Court should not have considered the factual question of when
the investigation was complete.
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events of the day of the offense"5 9 was held to constitute prejudice.
This seems to be a logical standard, because a truly "prejudiced" de-
fendant would often be unable to state exactly how he had been
prejudiced. 60  A court exercising its supervisory powers could easily
deem it inequitable to force such a defendant to stand trial. Even
some courts that employ a constitutional analysis of pre-arrest delay
claims have accepted the Ross "plausible claim of inability to remem-
ber" prejudice standard.61
A number of courts, however, faced with defendants who utilized
a tactic of "selective nonremembrance," realized that a general claim of
inability to recall could easily be feigned.62  The problem is mitigated
somewhat in cases where the defendant receives a full trial and then
appeals on the ground of pre-arrest delay, because the appellate court
has the benefit of the trial record and can determine how much the
defendant was in fact able to recall at trial. Courts have unanimously
discounted a defendant's claim of prejudice in cases where he gave de-
tailed testimony at trial63 or produced alibi witnessesf' But the trial
59. Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
60. As the Ross court stated:
His failure of memory and his inability to reconstruct what he did not remember virtu-
ally precluded his showing in what respect his defense might have been more successful
if the delay had been shorter .... In a very real sense, the extent to which he was
prejudiced by the Government's delay is evidenced by the difficulty he encountered in
establishing with particularity the elements of that prejudice.
Id, cited in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54-55 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. E.g., United States v. Lee, 413 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1022
(1970); United States v. King, 332 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1971); United States v. Wahrer, 319 F.
Supp. 585 (D. Alas. 1970); United States v. Godfrey, 243 F. Supp. 830 (D.D.C. 1965), ay'd, 358
F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d 526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973);
People v. Jennings, 11 IlL App. 3d 940, 298 N.E.2d 409 (1973); People v. Hernandez, 15 Mich.
App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1969).
62. Hurt v. United States, 314 A.2d 489, 494 (D.C. 1974); accord, United States v. Cowsen,
530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 504 F.2d 337
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); McConnell v. United States, 402 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969) (court found that the defendant was "pig tracking" Ross
and "setting up a situation to his advantage on claims which cannot be rebutted," 402 F.2d at
852-53); State v. Gardner, 534 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). But cf. State v. Roundtree, 106
N.J. Super. 135, 254 A.2d 337 (1969), af'd inpart and rev'd inpart, 118 N.J. Super. 22, 285 A.2d
564 (1971) (trial court's finding that the defendant infact had no recall held insufficient to estab-
lish prejudice).
63. E.g., United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Jackson, 504
F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); United States v. Lee, 413 F.2d 910 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1022 (1970); United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969); United States v. Baillie, 316 F. Supp. 892 (D. Hawaii
1970); People v. Herrara, 539 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1975); State v. Clapp, 335 A.2d 897 (Me. 1975);
People v. Johnson, 41 Mich. App. 34, 199 N.W.2d 561 (1972); State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482
P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972).
64. E.g., United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Roy v. United States, 356
F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965); People v. Herrera, 539 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1975); State v. Hodge, 153
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courts that have had to pass upon pre-arrest delay claims at pre-trial
hearings65 were still faced with the initial task of attempting to discern
genuine cases of prejudice. Accordingly, the majority of courts have
begun to demand a showing of prejudice greater than a general inabil-
ity to recall or reconstruct events.6 6  This new standard of prejudice
has been expressed in several different ways,67 but for the purpose of
this Note, it will be referred to as "actual prejudice."
Under this standard, the most common ground for finding suffi-
cient prejudice to warrant dismissal of an indictment or reversal of a
conviction is the defendant's inability to produce specifically identified
material witnesses. 8 A few courts have recognized other factors, such
as the disappearance or destruction of evidence,69 the unavailability of
Conn. 564, 219 A.2d 367 (1966); In re G.T., 304 A.2d 865 (D.C. 1973); People v. Johnson, 41
Mich. App. 34, 199 N.W.2d 561 (1972).
65. Indeed, a few courts have recommended that rulings on Ross-type motions be postponed
until after the defendant has been tried so that a decision can be made in light of all of the
evidence produced. The rationale behind this proposal is that a defendant facing trial has a much
greater incentive to make diligent efforts to recall events and locate witnesses. People v. Lawson,
38 I11. App. 3d 239, 347 N.E.2d 430 (1976), rev'don other grounds, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 367 N.E.2d 1244
(1977); accord, United States v. Wilford, 364 F. Supp. 738 (D. Del. 1973), a1 7'd, 493 F.2d 730 (3d
Cir. 1974); People v. Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 477 P.2d 421, 91 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1970); People v.
Collins, 66 Misc. 2d 340, 320 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1971).
66. See cases cited at notes 67-71 infra.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906
(1976) ("actual prejudice"); United States v. Aired, 513 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
828 (1975) ("substantial prejudice"); United States v. Golden, 436 F.2d 941, 943 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 910 (1971) ("peculiar circumstances" of prejudice); Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66,
68 (Alas. 1972) ("fact of prejudice").
68. See, ag., Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (woman with whom
defendant lived at time of offense died, another witness was himself arrested and refused to testify
on fifth amendment grounds; conviction reversed); United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847
(D. Md. 1976) (three defense witnesses denied recollection of events, and government's main wit-
ness could not recall crucial conversation; indictment dismissed); United States v. Kleinbard, 333
F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (defense was entrapment; witness who induced defendant to sell
drugs was arrested and later committed to a mental health clinic; witness refused to testify on
advice of attorney; indictment dismissed); United States v. Haulman, 288 F. Supp. 775 (E.D.
Mich. 1968) (six defense witnesses died; indictment dismissed); United States v. Curry, 284 F.
Supp. 458 (N.D. 1Il. 1968) (defense was entrapment; informant could not be located, motion for
judgment of acquittal sustained); United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965) (de-
fense counsel filed list of prospective witnesses who were no longer available by reason of death or
serious illness; indictment dismissed); Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66 (Alas. 1972) (defense was un-
able to contact witnesses who had moved from the area; conviction reversed and indictment dis-
missed with prejudice); Commonwealth v. De Rose, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 8, 307 A.2d 425 (1973)
(three witnesses acknowledged by the Commonwealth could not be located, and the Common-
wealth could not specify exact date of the offense; indictment dismissed); cf. People v. Archerd, 3
Cal. 3d 615, 477 P.2d 421, 91 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1970) (prosecution located the material witnesses
requested by defendant; conviction affirmed).
69. United States v. Golden, 436 F.2d 941 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 910 (1971); United
States v. Peterson, 302 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Minn. 1969).
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specific documents, 70 or the state's inability to specify the exact date of
the offense,7 1 as constituting sufficient "actual" prejudice.
The major import of this new standard is that, although the courts
are no longer burdened with distinguishing between honest nonremem-
brance and a feigned lack of recall, the defendant's actual inability to
reconstruct events is fatal to his fifth amendment claim. If he is unable
to specify with particularity any missing witnesses or documents, then
he is deemed not to have suffered sufficient prejudice. While the par-
ticularity requirement seems appropriate from a constitutional view-
point in light of Marion and Lovasco, it ignores the notions of equity
with which Ross was concerned. For example, a Ross-type defendant
who honestly cannot recall the events of the day in question, and who
may well be innocent, could never obtain relief under this standard,
while the difficulty of establishing "actual prejudice" might not defeat
the claim of a guilty defendant who may be more likely to remember
the events of the day of the crime and can therefore show that a mate-
rial witness is absent or that important evidence has been destroyed.
Furthermore, several courts have noted that a person's ability to
account for his whereabouts and activities is often related to his social
class. For example, the businessman who keeps desk calendars, ap-
pointment books and records of his daily transactions might find it eas-
ier to pinpoint alibi witnesses or material documents, and consequently
their absence or destruction, than would a lower-class defendant who
tends to "live from day to day."72
Despite the inequities inherent in a standard demanding a high
degree of particularity, a few courts employing a constitutional analysis
have established a still higher standard of prejudice-some requiring
the defendant to prove he made diligent attempts to locate the witness
or document,73 and others requiring the defendant to prove that the
70. United States v. Bray, 442 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971).
71. Commonwealth v. De Rose, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 8, 307 A.2d 425 (1973).
72. Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Wright, J., dissenting).
Compare Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965), United States v. Jones, 322 F.
Supp. 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1971) andPeople v. Hernandez, 15 Mich. App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1969)
with United States v. Feinberg, 383 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1967) and Morrison v. United States, 365
F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
73. E.g., People v. Gilmore, 239 CaL App. 2d 125, 48 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1965), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 961 (1966) (defendant who was given informer's name, description and address should have
located and cross-examined informant before the latter left town; no prejudice); State v. Bryson,
53 Haw. 652, 500 P.2d 1171 (1972) (defendant did not make a good faith attempt to locate wit-
nesses; no prejudice); People v. Lawson, 38 IlM. App. 3d 239, 347 N.E.2d 430 (1976), rev'don other
grounds, 67 II. 2d 449, 367 N.E.2d 1244 (1977) (defendant made diligent efforts to find out where
he was on the day in question, but union of which he was a member was on strike, and fellow
employees and friends could not remember, sufficient prejudice; indictment dismissed); People v.
laconis, 31 Mich. App. 703, 188 N.W.2d 175 (1971) (defendant's witnesses could not remember
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missing evidence would have been materially helpful to his defense.74
Several courts have declared an absence of prejudice based on their
own findings that the specifically identified missing evidence was not
significant to the case.75 Although appropriate from a constitutional
viewpoint, this standard lacks the flexibility necessary to treat fairly a
Ross-type defendant that is available under the court's supervisory
powers.
B. Justocation for the Delay.
Since many courts have adopted a balancing approach to pre-ar-
rest delay claims that weighs the prejudice to the defendant against the
reasonableness of the delay,76 there is substantial case law as to what
constitutes a "justifiable" delay.77 Some pre-arrest delays are clearly
justified, such as when the defendant's identity or complicity is un-
known to the police,78 when the defendant is hiding from the police or
events; but defendant did not attempt to question those witnesses until nine months after his
notice of alibi was filed; no prejudice); State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972) (although college student's trial took place after his witnesses had left
school, defendant was arrested five days before final exams; the witnesses were at another sus-
pect's preliminary hearing that defendant's counsel also attended, so defendant could have ar-
ranged for witnesses to be present; no prejudice); State v. Hackett, 26 N.C. App. 239, 215 S.E.2d
832, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 246, 217 S.E.2d 670 (1975) (defendant made no discovery efforts to
identify and locate the fifteen persons who were present at the scene of the crime; no prejudice).
74. State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976); see, e.g., United States v. Mays, 549
F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant did not show what the testimony of the deceased witnesses
would have been, nor did he show how the living witnesses would have testified had their memo-
ries not been dimmed; insufficient prejudice); United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973) (although the defendant's signature on a missing sign-in
sheet may have shown that he was in class at the time of the offense, the court found that the order
of names on the list might not necessarily correspond with arrival to class; no prejudice); Com-
monwealth v. Barnes, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 407, 352 A.2d 107 (1975) (only function of the missing
informant as a witness would have been to shed light on the question of credibility; no specific
prejudice shown from the loss of the original police records; insufficient prejudice).
75. United States v. Childs, 415 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1969) (court found that missing witnesses
could not have materially aided defendant's case, in light of other evidence of culpability; no
prejudice); United States v. Baillie, 316 F. Supp. 892 (D. Hawaii 1970) (court accepted agent's
testimony that none of the defendant's missing alibi witnesses were present during the narcotics
transaction; no prejudice); People v. Fiorini, 59 Mich. App. 243, 229 N.W.2d 399 (1975) (court
found that testimony of two alibi witnesses was so unbelievable that testimony of deceased alibi
witnesses would have been merely cumulative; no prejudice); State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482
P.2d 257 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972) (court found that testimony of missing wit-
nesses was not relevant to the narcotics transaction, but was only relevant to the credibility of the
undercover agent; no prejudice); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 407, 352 A.2d 107
(1975) (court found that the testimony of the missing informant would only have been relevant to
the question of his credibility; insufficient prejudice).
76. See cases cited at note 31 supra.
77. See cases cited at note 51 supra.
78. See United States v. Bray, 442 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971) (principal did not implicate
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simply cannot be located,79 or when further investigation of other
crimes of the defendant or his associates is necessary.80 However, a
delay is clearly unjustified when, for instance, an indictment is deliber-
ately delayed so that the fruits of discovery in a civil proceeding can be
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution,"' where prosecution is be-
latedly commenced in retaliation for the defendant's victory on appeal
from conviction of a separate offense82 or when an indictment is delib-
erately delayed in order to gain a tactical advantage over the defend-
ant.
83
The validity of several other alleged justifications for pre-arrest de-
lay is less clear. For example, in several cases the defendant has al-
leged that the delay, although not deliberate, was due to a lack of
diligence.8 4 Such delays have, of course, been deemed justified where
the courts have found that efforts to locate the defendant were diligent,
albeit unsuccessful." However, when the courts have found a lack of
diligence, the decisions have been inconsistent.8 6 Another unresolved
defendant until seven months after the offense); State v. Beilcourt, 293 Minn. 446, 196 N.W.2d 610
(1972) (police were unaware of defendant's identity).
79. "[O]ne cannot complain of a delay which he helped create." People v. Johnson, 41 Mich.
App. 34, 43, 199 N.W.2d 561, 565 (1972) (defendant eluded officers trying to apprehend him);
accord, United States v. Stanley, 422 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Morris, 308 F.
Supp. 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1970); People v. Iaconis, 31 Mich. App. 703, 188 N.W.2d 175 (1971); State v.
Midell, 40 Wis. 2d 516, 162 N.W.2d 54 (1968).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (investigation regarding defend-
ant's accomplices); United States v. Iannelli, 461 F.2d 483 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980
(1972) (investigation of defendants regarding other extortion activities); United States v. Stamas,
443 F.2d 860 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971) (investigation of other suspected criminal
activity on the part of defendant and his associates).
81. See United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965).
82. See People v. Hryciuk, 36 Il1. 2d 500, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967).
83. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
84. See cases cited at notes 85-86 infra.
85. United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973)
(officers put a "stop" on defendant's criminal record, instigated a lookout via teletype, checked
defendant's traffic records, visited defendant's parents' home, and checked with postal authorities
for defendant's forwarding address); see United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. Childs, 415 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1969); King v. United States, 369 F.2d 213 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 910 (1967); United States v. Pierce, 354 F. Supp. 616 (D.D.C.
1973), aj'd, 498 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
86. Several courts have ordered indictments dismissed for lack of diligence. United States v.
Haulman, 288 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Mich. 1968); United States v. Godfrey, 243 F. Supp. 830
(D.D.C. 1965), a#'d, 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. Jennings, I1 Ill. App. 3d 940, 298
N.E.2d 409 (1973); People v. Fiorini, 53 Mich. App. 389, 220 N.W.2d 70 (1974), rev'd after rehear-
ing onfacts, 59 Mich. App. 243, 229 N.W.2d 399 (1975) (court on rehearing reversed dismissal of
indictment due to finding of no prejudice). Other courts have held that the delays must be shown
to have been purposeful. Crawford v. State, 6 Ala. App. 71, 342 So. 2d 450 (1977); Bond v.
United States, 233 A.2d 506 (D.C. 1967); Commonwealth v. Jones, 360 Mass. 498, 275 N.E.2d 143
(1971). Two courts have remanded cases to the trial court in order to give the government a
second chance to justify the delay or disprove the defendant's allegation of prejudice. United
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issue is whether delays due to administrative changes and shortages of
manpower in the prosecutor's office should be deemed justifiable.87
The courts are also split as to whether delay is justified in order for the
state to determine if a prosecution can be avoided. 8
The most-litigated justification for pre-arrest delay has been an al-
leged need to continue undercover narcotics investigations.8 9 It is the
usual practice of undercover narcotics agents, in order to maintain their
"cover," to wait until they have completed a particular term of investi-
gation before swearing out a complaint.9° Delay in the institution of a
narcotics prosecution may also result from an effort to discover an of-
fender's sources9l or otherwise to conduct a more complete investiga-
tion.92 Although the vast majority of courts considering the issue have
determined delays rooted in such concerns to be legitimate, 93 a few
.States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977) (remanded for trial without prejudice to have trial
court determine whether prejudice to defendant was sufficient to dismiss when delay was clearly
due to negligence); Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
87. Three courts have found this type of delay to be unjustifiable. United States v. Alder-
man, 423 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D. Md. 1976) (if prosecution resources are scarce, the answer is to
increase staff rather than shortchange due process rights); United States v. Haulman, 288 F. Supp.
775 (E.D. Mich. 1968) (personnel changes in the United States Attorney's Office did not justify
delay); United States v. Curry, 284 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (turnover of staff and pressure of
work in prosecutor's office did not justify delay). However, two other courts have upheld such
delays on the rationale that only purposeful delays are unjustifiable. United States v. Tate, 336 F.
Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (change of administration and severe shortages of manpower in United
States Attorney's Office justified delay, where delay was not purposeful or oppressive); State v.
Gardner, 534 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (limited personnel and financial resources justified
keeping narcotics agent undercover for an extended period of time, so long as delay was not to
secure tactical advantage over defendant).
88. Compare United States v. Stewart, 426 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (when defendant
was involved in a first degree murder prosecution, state was justified in delaying indictment for
armed bank robbery to see if prosecution could be avoided) with United States v. Jasper, 331 F.
Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated and remandedfor reconsideration, 460 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1972)
(delay held unjustified when government was waiting to see whether "new developments" would
obviate the need for an indictment).
89. See cases cited at notes 90-91, 93-96 infra.
90. See, eg., United States v. Washington, 463 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wilson v. United
States, 409 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 983 (1969); People v. M., 61 Misc. 2d 542, 306
N.Y.S.2d 38 (County Ct. 1969); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 230, 275 A.2d 841
(1971).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 463 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Kleinbard, 333 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
92. See cases cited at note 93 infra.
93. Eg., United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976);
United States v. Emory, 468 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Wilson v. United States, 409 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 983
(1969); United States v. Williams, 352 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1973); McKay v. State, 489 P.2d 145
(Alas. 1971); People v. Gilmore, 239 Cal. App. 2d 125, 48 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1965), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 961 (1966); State v. Hodge, 153 Conn. 564,219 A.2d 367 (1966); State v. Royal, 217 Kan. 197,
535 P.2d 413 (1975); Jones v. State, 3 Md. App. 616, 240 A.2d 790 (1968); People v. Iaconis, 31
Mich. App. 703, 188 N.W.2d 175 (1971); State v. Gardner, 534 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
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courts have insisted that such factors as the length and manner of con-
duct of the investigation be subjected to a reasonableness standard. 94
And one court has held that a delay caused by an attempt to secure the
defendant as an informer is improper and unjustified.95
Delays for the purpose of continuing an undercover narcotics in-
vestigation can be justified only so long as the investigation is in pro-
gress. Several courts have therefore dismissed indictments on the
ground that once the agent had "broken cover," further delay was im-
proper.96
The question might be raised, however, whether any defendant
who has truly demonstrated prejudice should be forced to stand trial,
regardless of the government's justification. Even a valid reason for
the delay does not help the accused remember his whereabouts on the
day in question, nor does it revive a deceased witness for the purpose of
providing testimony. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declared
State v. Roundtree, 106 N.J. Super. 135, 254 A.2d 337 (Middlesex County Ct.1969), rey'don other
grounds, 118 N.J. Super. 22, 285 A.2d 564 (App. Div. 1971); State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d
257 (Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972); State v. Baca, 82 N.M. 144, 477 P.2d 320
(Ct. App. 1970); People v. M., 61 Misc. 2d 542, 306 N.Y.S.2d 38 (County Ct. 1969); State v.
Hackett, 26 N.C. App. 239, 215 S.E.2d 832, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 246, 217 S.E.2d 670 (1975);
Commonwealth v. McCloud, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 230, 275 A.2d 841 (1971); State v. Midell, 40 Wis.
2d 516, 162 N.W.2d 54 (1968).
94. See United States v. Jackson, 504 F.2d 337,340 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964
(1975):
We agree that the appellant was not prejudiced, but we do feel it important to dis-
cuss the reasonableness of the delay. We are aware of the vital role played by infor-
mants and undercover agents in the apprehension of persons engaged in illegal drug
traffic. Moreover, we respect the government's need to keep the identity of such infor-
mants and agents confidential, both to protect their safety and to continue to use them
effectively. [Citations omitted.] However, when the government chooses to continue the
use of a particular informant and delay the indictment of an individual already sus-
pected of an offense, it must recognize and respect the suspect's "accelerating need to
know that... he [is] ultimately going to be charged with having committed a [certain]
crime at a certain time and place.. ....
Accord, United States v. Williams, 352 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1973); People v. Lawson, 38 Ill.
App. 3d 239, 347 N.E.2d 430 (1976), rep'don other grounds, 67 ll.2d 449, 367 N.E.2d 1244 (1977).
95. United States v. Curry, 284 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
96. United States v. Kleinbard, 333 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (first four-month delay was
reasonable; next two-month delay was unjustified); United States v. Jones, 322 F. Supp. 1110
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (first one-and-one-half-month delay was reasonable; next three-and-one-half-
month delay was unjustified); United States v. Godfrey, 243 F. Supp. 830 (D.D.C. 1965), afy'd, 358
F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (first two-month delay was reasonable; next two-month delay was un-
justifiable); Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66 (Alas. 1972) (first one-month delay was reasonable; second
seven-month delay was unjustified); Cf United States v. Jackson, 504 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (first six-month delay was reasonable; second five-month delay
was unjustified, but court refused to dismiss indictment because defendant had not demonstrated
actual prejudice). Contra, People v. Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d 526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973)
(court found the first nine-month delay reasonable, and the second eighteen-day delay after the




that "the Due Process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay
as well as the prejudice to the accused. ' 97 Thus, under a constitutional
analysis the government's justification must be considered regardless of
the degree of prejudice suffered by the accused. On the other hand, a
supervisory powers approach would afford the courts more flexibility in
passing upon the claim of an accused and would permit the courts to
ignore the government's justification in cases of extreme prejudice.
C. Risk of Erroneous Conviction.
The Ross court pointed out that one of the reasons for its decision
was that the state's case against the defendant consisted "of the recol-
lection of one witness refreshed by a notebook."98 Although that fac-
tor was coupled with the defendant's plausible claim of inability to
remember, the same court that decided Ross stated one year later:
Our discussion of prejudice in Ross and the subsequent Narcot-
ics Delay cases was framed primarily in terms of the ability of the
accused to prepare and present a defense at trial. But the ultimate
prejudice that has concerned us in these cases has been the risk of
erroneous conviction attributable to the process which led to the ver-
dict of guilt. Delays prior to arrest which hinder or prevent presen-
tation of a defense shackle our system of determining truth through
the adversary process. The reliability of the verdict then depends
solely upon the quality of the police identification. The more inher-
ently unreliable the method of identification, the more the ultimate
prejudice-the risk of erroneous conviction.99
Several courts have considered the reliability of the method of
identification in evaluating pre-arrest delay due process claims.100
Some of the factors considered are whether the arresting officer was
acquainted with or had seen the defendant prior to the arrest; 01 the
number of confrontations that took place between the arresting officer
97. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
98. Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
99. Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
100. See cases cited at notes 101-06 infra See generally United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
101. See, ag., United States v. Mills, 463 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (officer had seen defend-
ant several times before arrest and knew defendant by nickname); King v. United States, 369 F.2d
213 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 910 (1967) (officer had known defendant for six to
eight years); People v. Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d 526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973) (officer knew
defendant before sale of narcotics); State v. Gardner, 534 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1976) (agent knew
defendant from high school and grade school); State v. Hackett, 26 N.C. App. 239, 215 S.E.2d 832,
cert. denied, 288 N.C. 246, 217 S.E.2d 670 (1975) (agent had known defendant for two years);
State v. McClintick, 23 Ohio Misc. 194, 255 N.E.2d 885 (1970) (officer saw and knew defendant
before and after sales); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 230, 275 A.2d 841 (1971)
(one informant had known defendant for over thirty years).
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and the defendant;" °z the length of those confrontations;10 3 the ade-
quacy of the officer's notes, if used in the process of identifying the
defendant;" whether the officer relied solely on his notes to identify
the defendant, or had some independent recollection;105 and whether
there was sufficient corroboration of the arresting officer's testimony.
10 6
Consideration of these factors may be improper under a constitu-
tional analysis, for it is questionable whether external evidence of the
102. See, e.g., United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906
(1976) (three encounters); Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (four
purchases); United States v. Golden, 436 F.2d 941 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 910 (1971) (two
purchases); Jordan v. United States, 416 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970)
(two purchases); McKay v. State, 489 P.2d 145 (Alas. 1971) (three purchases); In re W.C.R., III,
297 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1972) (multiple contacts); People v. M., 61 Misc. 2d 542, 306 N.Y.S.2d 38
(County Ct. 1969) (repeated sales); State v. McClintick, 23 Ohio Misc. 194, 255 N.E.2d 885 (1970)
(several sales); Commonwealth v. De Rose, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 8,307 A.2d 425 (1973) (one isolated
event).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 463 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dim lighting, one brief
encounter); Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (much time spent with de-
fendant); Bey v. United States, 350 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (lengthy, closely spaced confronta-
tions).
104. See United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (officer had detailed notes and
description); United States v. Mills, 463 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (officer had good notes with
name and description of defendant on drug envelopes); People v. Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d
526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973) (officer had good notes).
105. Some courts have noted that the officer did not use any notes to testify. United States v.
Bray, 442 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Golden, 436 F.2d 941 (8th Cir.), ceri. denied,
404 U.S. 910 (1971); United States v. Morris, 308 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Other courts
have noted that the officer used his notes sparingly, to refresh his recall as to details or collateral
matters. United States v. Baker, 424 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sanchez, 361 F.2d
824 (2d Cir. 1966); Bey v. United States, 350 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1965); McKay v. State, 489 P.2d
145 (Alas. 1971); State v. Gardner, 534 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1976); State v. McClintick, 23 Ohio Misc.
194,255 N.E.2d 885 (1970). Other courts have noted that the officer had no independent recollec-
tion and relied entirely upon his notes. Jackson v. United States, 351 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
106. Several courts have noted that there was sufficient corroboration of the officer's testi-
mony. United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976) (cor-
roboration by another agent); United States v. Golden, 436 F.2d 941 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 910 (1971) (corroboration by other agents); United States v. Baker, 424 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.
1970) (corroboration by co-defendant); Wilson v. United States, 409 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 983 (1969) (corroboration by two witnesses); United States v. Stewart, 426 F.
Supp. 58 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (corroboration by several witnesses and a purported accomplice);
Commonwealth v. McCloud, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 230, 275 A.2d 841 (1971) (corroboration by sev-
eral witnesses, two agents and one informant); Sf United States v. Baillie, 316 F. Supp. 892 (D.
Hawaii 1970) (court stated that although there was sufficient corroboration, such corroboration is
not demanded). A few courts have dismissed indictments and reversed convictions, noting a lack
of corroboration. Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (defendant was con-
victed solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the undercover officer); United States
v. Jones, 322 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (accompanying agents were not close enough to ob-
serve any more than that defendant went to the car, so acting agent's testimony was uncorrobo-
rated); People v. Hernandez, 15 Mich. App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1969) (defendant was convicted
on uncorroborated testimony); Commonwealth v. De Rose, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 8, 307 A.2d 425
(1973) (uncorroborated identification by one witness to one isolated event).
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defendant's guilt is relevant to a due process claim."°7 Under the Ross
supervisory powers analysis, however, it would be completely logical to
consider the quality of the state's evidence.
III. STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION
In evaluating pre-arrest delay claims, the factors discussed above
have been weighted differently by various courts. It is important to
analyze the approaches that have been taken, because the weight at-
tached to each factor, the peculiar manner in which the factors are wo-
ven into some general standard and the allocation of the burden of
proof on the various issues may significantly affect the defendant's suc-
cess in obtaining a dismissal. It should be remembered throughout the
following discussion that there are variations within each general cate-
gory, depending upon the degree of prejudice required by the court.
A. The Defendant Must Show Prejudice and That the Delay Was a
Deliberate Tactical Device.
Placing the burden on the accused to show that the pre-arrest de-
lay was an intentional device employed by the prosecution to gain
107. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (both
cases holding that the fourth amendment mandates suppression of illegally seized evidence re-
gardless of the fact that the evidence clearly establishes guilt). The Supreme Court also refused to
consider the evidence against the defendant in evaluating his fourteenth amendment due process
claim in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The Rochin Court noted that even completely
reliable evidence should not be admissible if it would "offend the community's sense of fair play
and decency." Id. at 173. It is at least arguable that if a defendant has suffered "actual
prejudice" due to a state-induced pre-arrest delay, it would offend society's notions of "fair play"
to permit consideration of the state's evidence to which the defendant cannot adequately respond.
Finally, in the recent case of Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Supreme Court sup-
pressed the defendant's incriminating statements and testimony that led the arresting officers to
the dead body of a small child, finding that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had
been violated. The Court did not dispute the lower court's finding that there was overwhelming
evidence against the defendant and that there was no doubt as to the defendant's guilt, but the
Court did not find this relevant to its determination as to whether a constitutional violation had
occurred:
The crime of which Williams was convicted was senseless and brutal, calling for
swift and energetic action by the police to apprehend the perpetrator and gather evidence
with which he could be convicted. No mission of law enforcement officials is more
important.... Although we do not lightly affirm the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus in this case, so clear a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as here
occurred cannot be condoned. The pressures on state executive and judicial officers
charged with the administration of the criminal law are great, especially when the crime
is murder and the victim a small child. But it is precisely the predictability of those
pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution
extends to us all.
Id. at 406. If, as the Marion-Lovasco cases indicate, the Constitution extends fifth amendment
protection to defendants who are substantially prejudiced by state-induced pre-arrest delay, then,
as in Brewer, evidence of the defendant's guilt is not a proper factor for consideration in evaluat-
ing the alleged constitutional violation.
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some tactical advantage over the defendant and that the delay was prej-
udicialmakes it almost impossible for the accused to obtain a dismissal
of the indictment. All of the courts that espouse this standard demand
a showing of substantial actual prejudice and some form of malicious
intent on the part of the prosecution. 108 While it is difficult enough for
a defendant who has no recall of events surrounding the crime to make
a showing of actual prejudice, it is even more difficult for a defendant
to establish a state of mind or motivation that is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the prosecution. Thus, it is not surprising that of the six
courts that follow this approach, only one has reversed a conviction on
pre-arrest delay grounds-and that decision was predicated on an ex-
treme factual situation.10 9
In support of this standard, it should be noted that its substantive
requirements and allocation of the burdens of proof are in literal com-
pliance with the constitutional test set forth in the Marion dictum. 1 0
However, supplemental treatment of the claim under a supervisory
powers review would help mitigate the problems this rigorous standard
presents for an innocent defendant.
B. The Defendant Must Show Prejudice and That There Was No
Reason for the Delay.
There are two states whose courts hold that both the absence of a
valid reason for the delay and the fact of prejudice must be established
in order to support a due process claim."' The conjunctive nature of
these requirements and the absolutism of the first element make the
standard almost as harsh as the one just discussed, although the de-
fendant can succeed merely by showing a lack of justification for the
delay and is not required to prove malicious intent on the part of the
state. The harshest feature of this standard is the allocation of the bur-
108. Crawford v. State, 6 Ala. App. 71, 342 So. 2d 450 (1977); State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346,
509 P.2d 331 (1973); State v. Royal, 217 Kan. 197, 535 P.2d 413 (1975); Blake v. State, 15 Md.
App. 674, 292 A.2d 780 (1972); People v. Johnson, 41 Mich. App. 34, 199 N.W.2d 561 (1972);
People v. Collins, 66 Misc. 2d 340, 320 N.Y.S.2d 693 (County Ct. 1971).
109. People v. Hernandez, 15 Mich. App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1969). In Hernandez the court
noted that there was no justification for the delay; that marked money was allegedly used but
never recovered; that the defendant was uneducated and illiterate; that there was a question of
credibility of the witness as a result of a deal between the witness and the prosecutor, that there
was otherwise no corroboration; that the defendant denied all knowledge of the transaction; and
that the arrest of the defendant was marked by unnecessary severity and indignity. That same
court subsequently reversed the quashing of an indictment, People v. Iaconis, 31 Mich. App. 703,
188 N.W.2d 175 (1971), and affirmed a conviction obtained after an unsuccessful pre-arrest delay
claim, People v. Johnson, 41 Mich. App. 34, 199 N.W.2d 561 (1972).
110. See text accompanying note 25 su.pra.
111. Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66 (Alas. 1972); State v. Roundtree, 106 N.J. Super. 135, 254
A.2d 337 (1969), rev'dan other grounds, 118 N.J. Super. 22, 285 A.2d 564 (1971).
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dens-the defendant ultimately has the burden of persuasion on both
issues, although the state must offer some evidence of justification once
the defendant establishes sufficient prejudice. 1 2  Thus, assuming that
the defendant demonstrates actual prejudice and the state contends that
further investigation was necessary, or that the defendant's identity was
unknown, or offers some other justification, the burden rests on the de-
fendant to disprove these allegations, although the information upon
which they are based may lie peculiarly within the knowledge of the
prosecution. It would seem more logical to place the burden of per-
suasion concerning the issue of justification on the party with access to
all of the relevant information.
Thus, the relief this standard provides from the Marion test is not
very substantial, because in practice the defendant will probably not
succeed in a motion for dismissal unless the state concedes a lack of
justification. 13 As noted above, a supplemental supervisory powers
analysis would tend to mitigate this problem.
C. Weighing the State's Just/cation for the Delay Against the
Prejudice to the Defendant.
Several courts apply a balancing test to determine whether the
state's justification for pre-arrest delay outweighs any prejudice result-
ing to the defendant.1 4 This standard, which is a clear departure from
the Marion test and from that discussed immediately above, allows the
courts to consider the reasonableness of the justification advanced by
the prosecution. 1 5  Thus, the defendant's motion for dismissal is not
foreclosed merely by a finding that some cause for delay actually ex-
isted. Furthermore, the burdens of persuasion are more logically
placed: the defendant has the burden to demonstrate prejudice, but the
112. State v. Roundtree, 118 N.J. Super. 22, 285 A.2d 564 (1971).
113. See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66 (Alas. 1972) (reversing a conviction where the state had
not even attempted to justify the pre-arrest delay).
114. Second Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, District Court for Maryland, District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, New Mexico Supreme Court and Wisconsin Supreme Court.
See cases cited at notes 117-18 infra.
115. See United States v. Jackson, 504 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964
(1975): "Even the legitimate excuse of a continuing undercover investigation may be stretched to
the breaking point; at some point, the accused's right to due process of law must prevail." 504
F.2d at 340; accord, United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847 (D. Md. 1976) where, although
the delay was not malicious and was probably due to higher priority being given to other investi-
gations, the court stated: "If the reason for such delay is the scarcity of prosecutors and the abun-
dance of culpable public officials, the answer is found not in shortchanging the due process rights
of individuals but rather in adequately funding and staffing prosecutorial offices." Id at 857.
For factors considered in evaluating the reasonableness of delay due to an undercover narcotics




prosecution has the burden to prove a valid and important reason for
the delay." 6 It should be noted, however, that the courts following
this standard demand a strong showing of actual prejudice, 117 and that
if sufficient prejudice is not demonstrated, the indictment will be up-
held even if the delay is without justification.'" I Indeed, the majority
of the federal cases decided under this standard have been disposed of
by a finding that sufficient prejudice had not been demonstrated, and
although the courts have usually made mention of the government's
justification, they have not found it actually necessary to employ a bal-
ancing process. "9 The federal courts that have found sufficient
prejudice to necessitate application of the balancing test have tended to
dismiss the indictments, giving little weight to the government's justifi-
cation. 120  The state courts, however, typically go through the process
of balancing even when the resulting prejudice has not been substan-
tial. 12
Aside from the difficulties associated with demonstrating the high
degree of prejudice required by this approach, 122 it is clear that even a
reasonable justification does not reduce the amount of prejudice suf-
fered by the defendant. 123  This second concern is somewhat mitigated
by the fact that, excluding undercover narcotics investigations, the
courts have been reluctant to find that the justification offered by the
prosecution for the delay outweighs the prejudice established by the
defendant. 124 Nevertheless, the first factor remains a rigid obstacle to
the success of a defendant's motion for dismissal, and, once again, a
supplementary supervisory powers analysis would seem to be appropri-
ate.
A variation of the balancing approach is found in several jurisdic-
116. See United States v. Stewart, 426 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
117. See, e.g., id; United States v. Aired, 513 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828
(1975); United States v. lannelli, 461 F.2d 483 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); United
States v. Stewart, 426 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847
(D. Md. 1976); State v. Baca, 82 N.M. 144,477 P.2d 320 (1970); Gonzales v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 548,
177 N.W.2d 843 (1970).
118. See United States v. Jackson, 504 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964
(1975).
119. See id; United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989
(1969); United States v. Stewart, 426 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
120. See United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847 (D. Md. 1976); United States v.
Haulman, 288 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
121. See State v. Baca, 82 N.M. 144, 477 P.2d 320 (1970); Gonzales v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 548,
177 N.W.2d 843 (1970).
122. See text following note 71 supra.
123. See text following note 96 supra.
124. See cases cited at note 120 supra.
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tions 2- that require dismissal of the indictment, even absent a showing
of prejudice, if the delay is motivated by a desire to gain a tactical
advantage over the defendant.' 26  The value of this standard depends
upon the purpose to be served by a defendant's fifth amendment objec-
tion. If the function of dismissing indictments on the basis of pre-ar-
rest delay is to deter the police and prosecution from engaging in such
conduct, then the standard is clearly logical. However, if the function
of such dismissals is to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, then
a dismissal without a showing of prejudice is an inappropriate remedy.
This is not to say that both of these functions-deterrence and due
process-cannot be mutually served. In fact, application of this stan-
dard is actually nothing more than an application of the Marion test in
disjunctive form.
D. After Prejudice and Justication Have Been Shown, the Court will
Consider the Reliability of the Method of IdentYcation.
It should be noted that none of the standards discussed to this
point have taken into consideration the reliability of the method of
identification, which is a key factor in determining the risk of an erro-
neous conviction. Several courts do consider this factor, but only after
both prejudice and justification have been shown.1 27 The burdens
under this standard seem to be properly placed: the defendant has the
burden of establishing prejudice, the state has the burden of establish-
ing justification and the court has the responsibility of inquiring into
the strength of the state's case as it relates to the risk of an erroneous
conviction.128
The standard itself, however, is of questionable validity. If the
right upon which a pre-arrest delay claim is based is of constitutional
dimension, evidence of the defendant's guilt may not be a proper factor
for consideration. 29  But if the courts were passing upon such claims
under their supervisory powers, it would be logical to consider the
quality of the state's evidence, and the courts would have more flex-
125. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stamas, 443 F.2d
860 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); Hamilton v. Lumpkin, 389 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.
Va. 1975).
126. See United States v. Stamas, 443 F.2d 860 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971);
State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976).
127. People v. Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d 526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973); People v. Lawson,
38 IlI. App. 3d 239, 347 N.E.2d 430 (1976), rev'don other grounds, 67 111. 2d 449, 367 N.E.2d 1244
(1977); see State v. Bryson, 53 Haw. 652, 500 P.2d 1171 (1972).
128. See People v. Vanderburg, 32 Cal. App. 3d 526, 108 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1973); People v.
Lawson, 38 IlM. App. 3d 239, 347 N.E.2d 430 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 67 Ill.2d 449, 367
N.E.2d 1244 (1977).
129. See note 107 supra.
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ibility in protecting defendants from the risk of erroneous convictions,
which was the primary focus of Ross. 130
E. Weighing Justzlcation Against Both Prejudice and the Reliability
of the Method of ldentffcation.
Several courts have noted that the resulting harm to the defendant
in a pre-arrest delay case may include prejudice or an unreliable
method of identification, or both."' The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia considered the "lurking danger of misidentification"
to be an element of prejudice, 32 whereas the other six courts that em-
brace this standard view the method of identification as an independent
factor, weighing it along with the defendant's allegation of prejudice
against the reasons asserted for the delay.133 Thus, under this stan-
dard, the state's evidence of the defendant's guilt is automatically con-
sidered in the adjudication of a pre-arrest delay claim, while under the
standard just discussed, such evidence is considered only after both
prejudice and justification have been shown.
This standard most directly serves the Ross objective of minimiz-
ing the risk of conviction of an innocent man. It also lends itself to a
flexible evaluation of prejudice, in that a minimal showing of prejudice,
such as a general inability to recall, may be deemed substantial in light
of the unreliability of the state's evidence. Thus, a defendant's pre-
arrest delay claim would not necessarily be foreclosed by his inability
to demonstrate, with particularity, "actual prejudice." The only prob-
lem with this standard, as noted in the preceding section, is that to the
extent that a motion for dismissal due to pre-arrest delay is based upon
constitutional grounds, evidence of the defendant's guilt is not an ap-
propriate factor for consideration. However, this approach would
seem to be the most logical and flexible scheme under a supervisory
powers analysis; indeed, it encompasses the very three factors that were
considered determinative in Ross.13 4
130. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
131. See cases cited at notes 132-33 infra.
132. United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975); accord, Robinson v. United
States, 459 F.2d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
133. United States v. Morris, 308 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Peterson, 302
F. Supp. 1232 (D. Minn. 1969); In re G.T., 304 A.2d 865 (D.C. 1973); State v. Thomas, 529
S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1975); State v. McClintick, 23 Ohio Misc. 194, 255 N.E.2d 885 (1970) (better
identification requires greater showing of prejudice); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 218 Pa. Super.
Ct. 230, 275 A.2d 841 (1971).
134. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
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IV. A Two-PRONGED ANALYSIS OF PRE-ARREST DELAY CLAIMS:
THE "RIGHT" AND THE "PRINCIPLE"
For the past twelve years, federal and state courts have been ap-
plying the above conflicting standards in an attempt to deal with claims
of pre-arrest delay solely on a constitutional level. Some of the stand-
ards are impossible to meet except under the most extreme circum-
stances, while others appear more just but include consideration of
factors posing legal and policy problems. Perhaps the basis of all of
this confusion is the courts' misunderstanding of the purpose of a Ross-
type claim, as distinguished from a more severe pre-arrest delay situa-
tion.
Pre-arrest delay problems can be divided into two categories. In
the first category, the defendant has been denied due process of law
because he is unable to prepare an adequate defense; in the second, the
circumstances are such that trial of the defendant would lead to the risk
of an erroneous conviction. The first category, which covers only the
most extreme situations, clearly calls for a constitutional analysis, while
the second category, which relates to Ross-type claims, should be han-
dled under the courts' supervisory responsibilities over criminal pro-
ceedings.' 35 Once it is realized that the Ross situation creates a
different problem, for which remedies independent of constitutional
considerations exist in the federal courts and in most state courts, the
development and application of standards for pre-arrest delay claims
should be relatively uncomplicated.
A. The 'Right" Where the Defendant Has Been Denied
Due Process.
In Marion the Supreme Court stated that a defendant's fifth
amendment rights would be violated if it were shown at trial that the
pre-arrest delay had caused substantial prejudice to his right to a fair
trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical ad-
vantage over him. Although the Marion test was merely dictum, it
would not seem improper to suggest that it be adopted, but applied in a
disjunctive fashion. Disjunctive application would serve the goals of
insuring due process to criminal defendants and of deterrence of im-
proper law enforcement behavior. Even if both parts of the Marion
test are subject to rigid standards of proof, neither would be impossible
to demonstrate independently;' 36 however, if the test were applied con-
135. See authorities cited at note 20 supra.
136. For situations in which the defendant has succeeded in demonstrating sufficient actual
prejudice, see text accompanying notes 68-71 supra and cases cited at note 68 supra. For situa-
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junctively, few, if any, defendants would succeed in their constitutional
claims.13
7
Under the disjunctive approach, prosecutors and police who delib-
erately delay arrests or indictments simply would not be allowed to
initiate a criminal action after an unreasonable period of time. The re-
sult of this approach is not unlike the suppression of illegally obtained
evidence'38 or confessions 139 to deter improper action by law enforce-
ment authorities. The potential that such improper action-be it un-
lawfully seizing evidence, illegally obtaining confessions or deliberately
delaying arrests-has for denying constitutional rights justifies severe
sanctions for the purpose of deterrence.
The existence of substantial prejudice is an independent constitu-
tional concern. If a defendant can show that because of the delay he is
unable to locate specifically identified witnesses or documents, or that
material witnesses have died or evidence has been destroyed, then he
should not be forced to stand trial. In order to assure that the claimed
prejudice is not being feigned or exaggerated, the defendant would
have the burden of proving that he made diligent attempts to locate the
witnesses or the documents, or to find substitute witnesses or evidence.
If this burden is met, then the state's justification for the delay should
not even be considered. 140 Balancing those factors would not decrease
the amount of prejudice suffered by the accused, and if he has demon-
strated the substantial prejudice described above, he has been denied
due process of law because of his inability to prepare an adequate de-
fense.
Although the level of prejudice required would be difficult to
prove and the standard as a whole remains subject to the inequities
discussed earlier,14 disjunctive application of the Marion test -would
assure the defendant the minimal protections necessary to guarantee a
fair trial, and that is all that the Constitution requires. Furthermore,
these inequities would be substantially ameliorated by the application
of a supplementary supervisory powers scheme of review, discussed be-
low, which would have the requisite flexibility to deal with less extreme
Ross-type pre-arrest delay claims.
tions in which the defendant has shown some sort of tactical advantage on the part of the state, see
text accompanying notes 81-83 & 92 supra and cases cited at note 96 supra.
137. For a list of cases in which the court applied the test conjunctively, see note 108 supra.
138. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
139. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
140. But see text accompanying notes 42 & 97 supra.
141. See text following note 71 supra and accompanying note 72 supra.
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B. The "Princ#ie'" "ere the Defendant is Subject to the Risk of an
Erroneous Conviction.
In cases in which the defendant cannot prove a deliberate tactical
delay or cannot establish prejudice with sufficient particularity to sat-
isfy the disjunctive Marion standard, he should be able to assert his
pre-arrest delay claim under a set of equitable principles adopted and
applied by the courts through their supervisory responsibilities over
criminal proceedings. It should be recalled that the Ross court's major
concern was that the defendant not be made to stand trial under cir-
cumstances that would lead to the risk of an erroneous conviction.
The equitable standard would involve weighing the state's justification
against the resulting harm to the defendant, which includes both
prejudice in preparing his defense and the risk of erroneous conviction
arising from unreliability in the method of identification.
The resulting prejudice and the method of identification should be
considered in the conjunctive, so that a minimal showing of prejudice
(a general inability to recall) would be afforded substantial weight if
the identification procedure were highly unreliable. On the other
hand, if the defendant asserts a general inability to recall in the face of
a highly reliable method of identification, then the resulting harm
would not be found substantial. Under this approach, it would be
proper to consider evidence of the defendant's guilt, as the court would
not be balancing away a constitutional "right," '14 2 but rather would be
applying "principles" of equity to evaluate the risk of an erroneous
conviction. 143 Furthermore, it would not be improper to balance the
resulting harm to the defendant against the state's justification for the
delay, as the courts' supervisory powers necessarily include the further-
ance of effective law enforcement as well as protection of the defend-
ant. Thus, all of the factors that create problems when examined from
a constitutional viewpoint could be validly and logically considered
under a court's supervisory powers.
The gist of the Ross "principle" is that the courts could evaluate
these factors in an extremely flexible manner, the end being to guaran-
tee "fundamental fairness" both to the defendant and to the state.
The requirement of prejudice would not be an insurmountable barrier
to a defendant if the method of identification were so unreliable as to
engender the risk of an erroneous conviction. Furthermore, the con-
sideration of justification would permit delays necessary for effective
142. See the Supreme Court's analysis in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), discussed at
note 107 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 19 supra and cases cited therein.
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law enforcement and the propriety of delays caused by negligence or
lack of manpower would be determined in light of the resulting harm
to the defendant. In short, under its supervisory powers the court
could consider and weigh all of the above factors and determine
whether trial of the defendant might lead to an erroneous conviction.
The "principle" would be one of "fundamental fairness."
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of pre-arrest delays, dealt with in Ross under the
court's supervisory responsibilities and discussed by the Supreme Court
in dicta in Marion and Lovasco as a potential constitutional violation,
has been handled in a conflicting manner by the courts over the past
twelve years. The current state of the law. makes imperative further
clarification by the Supreme Court in order to avoid the inequitable
administration of justice. It is suggested that, for extreme cases, the
Marion standard be conclusively adopted in a disjunctive fashion, so
that constitutional guarantees of due process of law would mandate
dismissal if the delay were perpetrated by the state to gain a tactical
advantage over the accused, or if the accused demonstrated that he had
suffered actual, substantial and irremediable prejudice. It is further
suggested that the lower federal and state courts, on their own initia-
tive, exercise their supervisory powers over criminal proceedings to dis-
miss indictments obtained under circumstances, such as those in Ross,
that tend to lead to the risk of an erroneous conviction.
Janis Merle Caplan
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